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International comparable data of Maddison and Summers and Heston show a
negative relation between labour productivity and labour force par-
ticipation. This relation is here incorporated in the Solow growth model. A
cross-section analysis of 95 countries describes about 90x of the inter-
national variation in income levels in a satisfactory way.
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Maddison's Phases of Capitalist Development was published in 1982. Among
economists this book has received much attention, especially after Baumol
(1986) referred to it in an article on the convergence of welfare in the
richest countries since 18~0. Recently, Maddison (1989) has updated the
internationally comparable data on GDP per working hour in 16 high-developed
countries. These are summarized here in the upper part of table 1. The
figures in brackets show the ranking of countries in terms of productivity.
It can be seen that in the first half of this century the productivity gap
with the United States has grown, whereas after 1950 all countries have come
into a stage of catching up with the USA. In this international productivity
contest, Belgium for instance moved to the second position, whereas the
Dutch economy on average remained in its place.
Table 1-3-
The lower part of table 1 gives Maddison's labour force participation
rates for the same set of countries. These rates show some remarkable ten-
dencies. In Canada, the USA and the Scandinavian countries, the par-
ticipation rat.es have increased, whereas in Belgium and France the par-
ticipation rates clearly have decreased. In other countries, such as the
Netherlands, the participation rates did not change very much. Thus, by
putting the tendencies of both parts of the table together a negative
relationship between productivity and participation is showing upl.
This article deals with the question, how, for a broad sample of
countries, the international variation in productivity is related to that in
labour force participation. Section 2 exsmines the recent dataset of Summers
and Heston (1991), which displays internationally comparable economic time
series covering a large nurober of countries. These figures also point at a
negative relation between productivity and participnc,ion. Section 3 sup-
plements this relation with the variables prescribed by the Solow growth
model. This model describes nearly 90x of the international variation in
productivity. For certain reasons however the standard model must be
rejected. Section 4 introduces the Solow model augmented with human capital,
ns suqqr`StFd by Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1990). Thr~ rt~tr' r)f investmt`nt 1n
human capital is approximated by the ratio between a variable describing the
educational level and the participation rate. This leads to the conclusion
that the augmented model, embodying the negative relation between produc-
tivity and labour force participation, is consistent with the international
variatíon in productivity.
2. The data of Summers and Heston
The Summers and Heston dataset covers 138 countries for the period 1950-
1988. For a number of countries the series start in 1960. That is why we
only use the series from 1960 onwards. The number of countries has been
reduced from 138 to 95 for several reasons. The main oil producing countries
have been left aside, because productivity in these countries can't be
traced back to production circumstances prevailing in the other countries.
The availability of data according to the supplementary data set of Barro-4-
(1991) on for instance the degree of schooling also pleys a role in restric-
ting the sample. In addition countries with a relatively small population
size, such as Luxembourg and Iceland have been omitted.
Table 2 summarizes the relevant information. The countries are classified
according to their productivity levels in 19852. Productivity is defined as
GDP (Y) per worker in the labour force (L), where GDP is in 1985 inter-
national prices.
Table 2
The table distinguishes 5 groupes of 19 countries. The bottom line reports
the figures for all 95 countries together. The classification implies that
group I comprises the richest and group V the poorest countries. The columns
show the avarage values of respectively the growth rate of labour produc-
tivity (G), the growth rate of population (n), the growth rate of the labour
force (GL), the investment rate in physical capital (ck), the investment
rate in human capital (vh), the participation rate in 1960 (P60} and the
productivity level as a percentage of US-productivity in 1960 and 1988 (CU60
and CU88). The figures have not been weighted with the size of the
countries. The measurement of investment in human capital will be discussed
below.
The table expressea the well-known fact that the rate of investment
is lower and population growth is higher if a country is poorer. (The only
exception is population growth in group V, which is below that of group IV.)
Further it appears that the rich and sub-rich countries exhibit nearly the
same productivity growth snd are catching up with the USA. However, the
relative position of group III vis-à-vis group II hardly has changed,
whereas the position of II vis-à-vis I has worsened somewhat. The poor
countries are clearly put back during the considered period (1960-1988).
In the Summers and Heston dataset, the participation rate is defined as
the ratio between the labour force and total population, both expressed in
persons. In table 2, the difference between GL and rt thus describes the
change of the participation rate over the period 1960-1988. It appears that
for the "world" as a whole, labour force participation has diminished
sligthly. Thia is the net result of increasing participation rates in the-5-
rich and sub-rich countries on the one hsnd and decreasing participation
rates in the poor and poorest countries on the other hand.
As said above we shall deal with the question, how the international
variation in productivity is related to the international variation in
labour force participation. A first investigation points at a significant
negative relation between productivity and participation in a cross country
regression (OLS) for the sample of 1960:
RnL(60) - -1.72 ~nP(60) t 14.60
(-4.30) (9.85) R2 - 0.16
(2.1)
The number of countries is 95. The numbers between brackets are t-values.
The dependent variable is labour productivity in 1960. This is "explained"
here for about 16x by the participation rate in 1960. In addition, the cross
sectional relation between productivity in 1988 and the participation rate
in 196o also appears to be significant:
~nL(88) - -2.02 ~nP(60) t 16.21
(-4.45) (9.63) R2 - 0.17
(2.2)
However, the relation between productivity and participation is completely
absent when only the year 1988 is considered:
~nL(88) - 0.21 ~nP(88) } 7.97
(0.35) (3.72) R2 - 0.00
(2.3)
Thus, the first impression is that the participation rate of 1960 could be a
part in describing the international variation in productivity in both the
first and the last year of the sample. This does not hold for the par-
ticipation rate in 1988. We will argue that the latter might be traced back
to the fact that most countries in 1960 were farther from the steady state
than in 1988.
~-6-
3. The Solow model
3.1 The steady atate
The Solow growth model starts from a lineair homogenous production
function with labour-saving technical progress. The Cobb-Douglas function is
an example:
Y(t) - K(t)aN(t)1-~, where O~o:~l (3.1)
K is the stock of physical capital and N the number of effective units of
labour. (From now on the time subscript "t" will be omitted for con-
venience.) Both inputs are paid their marginal products. Effective labour is
defined as the product of population (POP), the participation rate (P) and
an index for the level of technology (A):
N- AMP}POP - AL, where A- A(0)ept and POP - POP(0)ent (3.2)
Population grows exogenously at rate rt and technology at rate p. The labour
force is the product of population and the participation rate: L-P~POP.
Expressed in effective units of labour the production function is:
y-ka, withy-Y~Nandk-K~N (3.3)
Output per effective unit of labour (y) will further be called "output-
intensity" and the stock of capital per effective unit of labour "capital-
intensity". It is important to distinguish output-intensity (y) from labour
productivity (Y~L), because only the latter can be deduced from empirical
data.
The standard Solow model assumes an exogenous labour supply. In this case
the accumulation equation reads as3:
dk-i-gk át (3.4)-~-
The gross rate of growth g(-átrt4p), which comprises the depreciation rate
á, is also exogenous. The model is completed with the consumption function
(So1ow, 1956):
c-(1-a)y, so that i- ay, as y- c} i (3.5)
The savings rate 6 is exogenous. Using (3.5)~ the accumulation equation is
expressed in the capital-intensity as:
dk a
dt - 6k - gk (3.6)
In the steady state (dk~dt~0) output (Y), the atock of capital (K) and
effective labour (N) grow with the sum of population growth (n) and tech-
nical progress (p). The savings rate only determines the level of the steady
state. The Solow model has the well-known property that the steady-state
solution is stable in the sense that any dynamic path from arbitrary initial
conditions converges through time to a steady state with constant capital-
intensity.




The Solow model predicts a higher steady-state output-intensity (y) when the
savings rate is higher and~or population growth is lower. Figure 1 shows the
(world)production function (ka), which is assumed to be identical for all
countries. In contrast savings (ay) and steady-state investment (gk) are-8-
country-specific, because 6 and g differ between countries. Thus each
country has its "own" steady atate, determined by the equality of savings
and steady-state investment.
3.2 Estimation
The main parameter of the Solow model to be estimated is a, the share of
capital in income. The empirical specification of the model follows from the
log-linear version of the production function, after substituting the
steady-state capital-intensity into it. The latter can be deduced from the
accumulation equation (3.6):
kN - (6~8)1~(1-a) (3.7)
Substituting (3.7) into (3.3), taking logs and rearranging terms results in:
.~n L-~n A(0) t pt t la~ ~n6 - laa ~ng (3.8)
Given marginal-productivity theory, the model not only predicts the signs
but also the values of the coefficients. If for instance a-1~3, the model
implies an elasticity of labour productivity with respect to the rate of
savings of 0.5 and an elasticity with respect to the growth rate of -0.5.
Following Mankiw et al. (1990), it is assumed that population growth is
country-specific, whereas Stp is some fixed number, ssy 5X, for all
countries. The term A(0) not only represents technology, but also
institutions, climate and so on. It is assumed that:
.~nA(0) - a. e, where a constant and e country-specific
According to (3.8) the dependent variable is the level of labour produc-
tivity in a year, for which it is assumed that all countries are in their
steady states or that deviations from the steady state are random. The
explanatory variables are the steady-state savings rate and population
growth. Thus the empirical problem is to gather data for Y~L, cs and n, which
are representative for steady growth. Mankiw et al. (1990) approach Y~L by
the figures for the last year of their sample, namely 1985. The independent-9-
variables are the rate of investment averaged over 1960-1985 as an ap-
promixation for the savings rate and the average rate of growth of the
working-age population as an appromixation for population growth.
These choices are questionable. In the first place it seems to be impos-
sible to find a certain year, for which it may be assumed that all countries
are in steady growth. In the second place the participation rates are chan-
ging and diverging strongly in the world (see table 2)4. The international
variation in labour force participation not only can be traced back to
social-cultural and demografic factors, but also to reactions of labour
supply to changes in real wages and real wealth during the adjustment to the
steady state (Boggess, 1983). In the steady state the models with an
exogenous respectively endogenous labour supply may work out the same in the
end (Bhasin, 1991), but out of the steady state there are important dif-
ferences.
3.3 Convergence
According to a suggestion of Burmeister en Dobell (19~0), following Solow
(1956), the effective labour force may not only depend on time, but also on
real wages:
N - AMPOP~W(w)
The function w (w) denotes the participation rate, which depends on the real
wage rate (w). In this case the accumulation equation (3.6) is supplemented
with an additonal term:
dt - oka - gk -~ynw dt'
where r~)0 and nw)0 (3.9)
Here ~W is the elasticity of the participation rate with respect to the wage
rate and nw the elasticity of the wage rate with respect to the capital-
intensity. When dW~dw~O as we normally would expect (and since dw~dk is
always positive), the qualitative behaviour of the capital-intensity is
unaltered by this modification, allowing the stability conclusions of the
standard Solow model to remain valid. The steady state is again described by
(3.~). This implies that countries are in the same steady state, although-10-
they may exhibit different participation rates. Outside the steady state
however the international variation in participation rates may have impor-
tant consequences. The following examples serve to illustrate this.
First assume two countries which at time t-0 are completely identical
(the same Y, K, P, POP, A, a, c en g). In terms of figure 1, both countries
are at the left of the steady-state capital-intensity. In addition, assume
that the participation rate is endoRenous in country 1 and exoqenous in
country 2. Convergence to the steady state implies rising real wages. This
induces a growing labour supply in country 1, so that growth in this country
lags behind that of country 2. During the adjustment process labour produc-
tivity of country 2, with the fixed participation rate, instantly surpasses
labour productivity of country 1, where the participation rate is rising.
Consequently country 2 will approach the steady state faster than country 1.
(We abstract from international mobility of labour, which speeds up conver-
gence between countries; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1990.) In the steady state
both countries have the same capital-intensity again. There is a difference
however. The labour force (L) and consequently output (Y), consumption (C)
and the stock of capital (K), are greater in country 1 than in country 2. In
other words, the steady-state level of output in a country with more working
hours is higher than that in an otherwise completely identical country with
more leisure.
It may be helpful to demonstrate the effects of different participation
rates with the aid of a numerical example, without an endogenous labour
supply. Assume two identical countries with exogenous participation rates,
where POP-A-1, K(0)-2, a-0.5, 6-0.3, rt-p-0 en á-0.1. The only difference is
that P-1 in country 1 while P-0.5 in country 2. Table 3 describes the
initial positions and the dynamics of convergence to the steady state.
Table 3
Both countries start with the same capital stock, K(0). That is why country
1 with the high participation rate exhibits a lower capital-intensity than
country 2. (Notice that in terms of income per capita (Y~POP) the dif-
ferences are t~e other ~ay about.) For both countries the steady state is
reached at y-3 and k-9. At any moment in time, country 1 is farther away
from the steady state than country 2. This difference persists, although it-11-
diminishes in course of time. Thus country 1 grows faster than country 2.
This is the well-known neoclassical convergence prediction. Identical
countries with different initial positions will converge to the same steady
state. In the recent past there is a renewed interest for this prediction
(Baumol, 1986, Baumol en Wolff, 1988, DeLong, 1988, Barro en Sala-i-Martin,
1990, 1991 en Barro, 1991). However, the possibility that such countries
(with the same a and g) may exhibit important differences in income per
capita (Y~POP), which can be traced back to different participation rates,
has received little attention in the literature.
The examples show that the negative relationship between~productivity and
participation essentially is another manifestation of the negative relation
between growth and the level of productivity at some initial date as
predicted by the Solow model. Countries with low participation rates are
relatively close in the neighbourhood of their steady state and consequently
exhibit lower growth rates than countries with high participation rates.
3.4 First results
The Solow model does not predict convergence to the same steady-growth
path if population growth and savings rates differ between countries. In
that case the model predicts conditional convergence, in which each country
converges to its own steady state. Thus, apart from the effect on growth
rates of different productivity levels at some initial date, convergence
takes place at country-specific growth rates.
w
Let Y~L be the actual value of productivity and let (Y~L) be the steady-
state value of productivity, then linearizing around the steady state
results in (Mankiw, et.al., 1990):
Y
w
n L-~~~n(~) - .~n L]. where ~- g(1-a) (3.10)
The convergence rate is ~. If for instance g-0.10 and ~-1~2 then ~-0.05,
hence the economy moves halfway to the steady state in about 14 years.
Equation (3.10) implies:
~nY - .~nY - RnY(0) - (1-e-~t)~~n(Y)~ - .~nY(0)~ L L L L L
dt
(3.11)-12-
Thus growth is a function of the initial level of productivity and the
steady-state level of productivity, the latter serving as an attractor to
which economic growth ultimately converges. Equation (3.11) expresses the
negative relationship between growth and the level of productivity at an
initial date. A well-known criticism of this prediction is that it only
holds for the richest countries (DeLong, 1988). For a more extended sample
this relation clearly does not hold5. From a theoretical point of view
however this criticism is not justified, because this partial relation
cannot be decoupled from the determinants of the ultimate steady state.
In (3.11), the steady state can be made explicit by substituting (3.8)
into it. Assuming ~nA(0) - a f e and t-0 the result is:
~nL -
(1-e-~t)~laa
(~na - ~ng) t a~ . e-~t~nL(0)
(3.12)
This equation describes the level of productivity at some moment in time.
Assuming that a en g are independent of E, i t is allowed to estimate this
equation with OLS.
As equation ( 3.12) embodies the convergence dynamics, i t is preferred
to (3.8). This advantage ia important, because there is no adequate em-
pirical information on steady-state productivity levels. Thus with equation
(3.12) we restrict ourselves to the explanation of the international
variation in productivity in a certain year, where v and g function as a
measure for the country-specific ateady state to which productivity con-
verges.
Equation ( 3.12) does not contain the participation rate. As we have seen
above, the international variation in labour force participation is con-
nected with the international variation of productivity at some initial
date. In case of constant participation rates, ( 3.12) would suffíce. In
reality however labour force participation has strongly changed. In the rich
and sub-rich couiitries the participation rates have increased, whereas in
the poor and poorest countries participation has diminished ( see table 2).
For these countries this points at a slower respectively faster convergence
to the steady state than in the group of countries ( III, see table 2) where
the participation rates approximately have remained unchanged. This is
treated by adding the change of the participation rate to equation (3.12).-13-
The effect of this addition will be recognized by estimating the Solow model
first without participation.
The dependent variable is GDP per worker in 1988. The explanatory
variables are the rate of investment ak averaged over 196o-i988 as an ap-
promixation for the steady-state savings rate and the average growth rate of
total population. Notice that in this period economic growth has slowed
down, especially in the richest countries6. However, for the Solow model it
is not necessary to model this slowdown, because in approaching the steady
state convergence will go slower. In this respect the Solow model is consis-
tent with the high growth rates in the sixties and the slowdown afterwards.
Estimating (3.12) without imposing restrictions on the coefficients gives:
~nL(88) - 0.35 ~nak - 0.68 ~ng } 0.8~ ~nL(60) f 1.92
(4.29) (-1.80) (14.95) (1.80)
R2 - 0.88, N- 95 en SSE - 13.49
(3.13)
The numbers between brackets are t-values, whereas SSE is the residual sum
of squares. All coefficients have the expected sign. The explained variance
is substantial. The equation describes nearly 90x of the international
variation in productivity in 1988.
Equation (3.13) also has a defect, however. It appears that the t-value
of the coefficient of the growth rate is low, as compared with the t-value
of the coefficient of the rate of investment. Presumably population growth
as a determinant of country-specific steady growth does not show up well.
This is connected with the already observed difference between population
growth and growth of the labour force (see table 2). Mankiw et al. (1990)
have used the growth rate of the working-age population, so that changes in
the participation rate affect their results. However, it is more accurate to
make this explicit, so that population growth as a determinant of the steady
state can show up better. This can be captured by adding the change of the
participation rate from 1960 to i988 to the equation. However, from equation
(2.3) we already know that the relation between productivity and par-
ticipation in 1988 is completely absent. This has to do with the fact that
the convergence to the ateady state, which is approximated by the investment
rates and population growth of the period preceding 1988, will be completed
to an considerable extent in this year. In 1988 countries are closer to the-14-
steady state than in 1960, so that the international variation in par-
ticipation rates in 1988 carries less weight for the convergence dynamics
than that of 1960. The latter is affirmed by equation (2.2) above. It
therefore suffices to introduce the participatíon rate of 1960 only:
.~nL( 88 ) - 0 . 35 ,~nvk - 1. 09 .~ng - 0 . 52 ,CnP ( 60) t 0 . 78 .~nL( 60) ~ 5 . 37 ( 3 .14 )
(4.41) (-2.73) (-2.56) (11.89) (3.16)
R2 - 0.88, rr - 95 en SSE - 12.57
Zn this equation population growth clearly matters. The negative relation
between productivity in 1988 and participation in 1960 shows up we117.
However, theory requires that the coefficients of the rate of investment and
population growth are reatricted to be equal to each other with an opposite
sign8:
~nL (88 ) - 0. 40 (,~n6k - ,~ng) - O. 38 ~tnP ( 60 ) t 0 . 84 ,~nL ( 60 ) t 2 . 89 ( 3 .15 )
(5.16) (-2.02) (14.83) (2.99)
R2 - 0.88, N- 95 en SSE - 13.01
Compared with (3.14) the residual sum of squares hardly has increased, so
that the restriction need not be rejected (F-test on the restriction yields
F-3.117). The negative relation between productivity and participation needs
to be rejected neither.
A less good point of equation (3.15) is the value of the production-
elasticity of capital (a-0.72). This is clearly to high, as compared with
the empirical value of the capital share in income of about 1~3. The es-
timated value of a is even closer in the neighbourhood of 1 than 1~3. Thus
we cannot rule out the possibility that a-1. In this case there are no
longer decreasing returns to the set of reproducible inputs, which is the
central presupposition of the Solow model. (In case a-1 the Solow model is
transformed into an endogenous growth model.) Further it appears that the
speed of convergence is very low (~-0.006), implying that the economy moves
halfway to the steady state in about 116 years. The high value of a leads to
the conclusion that the standard Solow model cannot be accepted.-15-
4. The adapted Solow model
4.1 A preliminary example
The Ramsey version of neoclassical growth theory stresses the intertem-
poral trade-off between consumption and leisure. In this model both the
savings rate and the participation rate may be endogenous, depending on
parameters such as the rate of time preference and the probability of dying
(Blanchard en Fisher, 1989). The measurement of these parameters is an
important problem in the empirical implementation of such models. Inspired
by the work of for instance Barro, several proxies have been constructed.
The introduction of such variables might improve the Solow model to a con-
siderable extent. To illustrate this, let us add the average age of the
labour force (AV) to equation (3.12) as an (arbitrary) example:
RnL(88) -0.2~(~nok-~ng) -0.61~nP(60) }0.67~nL(60) t 3.66~nAV(60) -7.68 (4.1)
(3.40) (-3.21) (9.12) (3.48) (-2.42)
R2 - 0.89, N- 95 en SSE - 11.46
AV(1960) has been taken from the dataset of Barro (1991). The average age of
the labour force is positively correlated to productivity. Comparing this
result with (3.15) it appears that adding AV has changed the values of the
coefficients to a considerable extent (a-0.45 in stead of a-0.~2 and
a-0.o143 in stead of a-0.006). The value of a even becomes more plausible if
the poorest countries are left aside (N-76: a-0.375).
Equation (4.1) indicates that the Solow model, provided that it is aug-
mented appropriately, is well able to describe the international variation
in productivity in a satisfactory way. Recently Mankiw et al. (1990) have
already reached this conclusion. They stick to the standard Solow model with
exogenous savings, only by adding human capital. It will be shown that this
is a fruitful point of view to shed more light on the negative relation
between productivity and participation.-16-
4.2 Human capital
The introduction of human capital (H) changes equation (3.1) into:
Y - K~ii~Nl-a-S, met atg(1 (4.2)
The condition a.s(1 implies decreasing returns to reproducible inputs, so
that the neoclassical basic assumption is preserved. Written in effective
units of labour the production function reads:
y- kahs, waarin y- Y~N, k- K~N en h- H~N (4.3)
In order to minimize the differences with the standard model it is assumed
that consumption can be transformed costlessly into physical or human
capital and that human capital depreciates at the same rate as physical
capital does. The consumption function again is c-(1-o)y, but now a-aktóh'
In this case the dynamics of the economy is governed by two accumulation
equations:
dk
dt - oky - gk en á t - 6hy - gh (4.4)
This model predicts a fixed ratio between human and physical capital in the
steady state, which equals the ratios of the savings rates. Using this
ratio, the steady-state levels are easily found as:
and
kN - ~(ak-~ ~)~B~i~(1-a-~)
hN - ~(~h-a ok)~B~1~(1-~-P)
(4.5)
(4.6)
Substituting (4.5) and (4.6) into (4.3), taking logs and rearranging terms
results in an equation which is similar to (3.8).
.En L a ,~nA(0) t Pt 4 1-a-p ~nokF ~-~ ,tn6h- l~á-~ ~ng (4.7)-17-
If for instance a-~-1~3, the coefficient of ~nak equals 1. According to
(3.8) the elasticity is 0.5. Hence, the presence of human-capital ac-
cumulation increases the impact of physical-capital accumulation on produc-
tivity.
4.3 Final results
Substituting equation (4.~) into (3.11) gives an equation similar to
(3.12):
~n~ - (1-e-at)~1-a-a ~nakf ~ ~n6h - laá-~ ~ng . a] t e-~t~nL(0)
(4.8)
with speed of convergence:
~ - B(1-a-~)
If for instance g-0.06 and a-~-1~3, then a-0.02, so that the economy moves
halfway to the steady state in about 35 years.
In estimating equation (4.8) the measurement of human capital is a prac-
tical problem. The average degree of schooling of the labour force could be
a good measure for ah, but for the broad spectrum of countries considered
here this measure is not available. That is why we propose to approximate
investment in human capital by9:
Students POP SER Students~L
~h - POP(12-17) L - P - POP(12-17)~POP
POP is total population, L the labour force, P the participation rate and
SER de Secondary Enrollment Rate, that is the number of students in secon-
dary school as a percentage of population in the same age.
The third way of writing shows that investment in human capital increases
as the ratio between students and the labour force raises and~or as the
share of young people in total population diminishes. According to the
second way of writing the same happens if the degree of schooling of young
people increases and~or the participation rate decreases. These ratios
should be considered as representative for steady-state investment in human
capital. This raises the problem that, up till now, secondary enrollment-18-
rates have increased instantly. That is why we take for SER the most recent
data available, namely for the year 1985 (Barro, 1991). The participation
rate again is from 1960. This is motivated by the reasoning that - given the
same degree of schooling of young people - the degree of schooling of the
labour force in a country with a low participation rate is higher than in a
country with a high participation rate.
The data in table 2 show a positive correlation between productivity and
investment in human capital. Nevertheless, the variation of ah even within
the group of rich countries is considerable. A ranking of the first 10
countries in terms of oh shows the Netherlands at top, followed by South
Korea, Canada, Belgium, Norway, the USA, Ireland, Spain, Australia and New
Zealand. The favourable position of the Netherlands and South Korea depends
on the relatively low participation rates in these countries. In contrast
Switzerland for instance has a very low rate of investment in human capital,
because in this country a low degree of schooling is coupled to a high
participation rate.
Without imposing restrictions, estimation of (4.8) gives:
~nL(88) - 0.27 ~nak - 0.72 ~ng f 0.28 ~noh . 0.66 ~nL(60) t 3.36 (4.9)
(3.51) (-2.16) (4.97) (9.97) (3.38)
R2 a 0.90, N- 95 en SSE - 10.59
And after imposing restrictions, we get:
~nL(88) 3 0.27 (~n6k-~ng) . 0.28 (~nah-~ng) t 0.67 ~nL(60) . 2.93 (4.10)
(3.86) (5.05) (10.52) (5.76)
R2 z 0.90, N- 95 en SSE - 10.62
The restriction that the coefficients of ~nak, ~nah and ~ng sum to zero, is
not rejected (F-0.12). From a theoretical view point equation {4.10) is
acceptable, as appears from the value of ~, which is in the neighbourhood of
the expected value of 1~3 (a-0.31, whereas ~-0.32)10. The value of the speed
of convergence (a-0.0142) implies that the economy moves halfway to the
steady state in about 50 yearsli. This is less than half of the time,
predicted by the Solow model according to (3.15). Nevertheless the period of
adjustment is very long. However, recursive regression shows that this is-19-
mainly due to the influence of the poor countries in the sample. Restricting
the number of countries for instance to the ~0 richest countries at date
1985 gives ~-0.0219. In this case the economy moves halfway in about 32
yearsl2. Further research must show whether this can be traced back to
factors specific for poor countries. Investigations of for instance Kormendi
en Meguire (1985), Grier and Tullock (1989) and Barro (1991) give ground for
this direction of reserach.
5. Conclusion
Just like the standard Solow model, the model with human capital predicts
conditional convergence. Countries will approach the steady state, deter-
mined by the country-specific investment rates and population growth. These
positions can now be calculated by substituting a-~-1~3 and the country-
specific values of ck, oh and g into the equations (4.3), (4.5) and (4.6).
The results show the steady-state position of each country on the
(world)production function. It appears that the ranking of countries in
terms of their steady-state output-intensity strongly diverges from the
ranking in table 2 on the basis of actual labour productivity in 1985. The
first 5 countries now are Finland, Norway, Denmark, Belgium and the
Netherlands. These countries have in commo~i that population growth is
relatively low. Moreover these countries show high investment rates in human
capital. In addition the Scandinavian countries exhibit high rates of in-
vestment in physical capital, which altogether explains their leading
position on the production function.
Our results thus show a remarkable picture of the country-specific
steady-state positions in the world. Nevertheless the posítion of the poor
countries remains to be very low. According to the Solow model adjusted with
human capital, this can be changed if the investment rates increase and
population growth weakens in these countries. In this respect, investment in
human capital, by higher degrees of schooling and~or lower participation
rates, may serve as an engine of growth by inducing more investment in

















GDP per hour, 1900-1986 (US-1oo)
1900 1913 1950 1973 1986
94 ( 2) 86 ( 2) 64 ( 3) 68 ( 6)
47 (l0) 46 (10) 26 (15) 57 (14)
63 ( 5) 58 ( 6) 40 (l0) 62 (12)
61 ( 6) 76 ( 3) 76 ( 2) 85 ( 2)
52 ( 8) 56 ( 7) 42 ( 9) 61 (13)
30 (15) 31 (15) 30 (13) 55 (15)
41 (12) 41 (14) 38 (11) 67 ( 7)
49 ( 9) 48 ( 9) 29 (i4) 63 (li)
39 (14) 42 (11) 33 (12) 66 ( 8)
16 (16) 17 (16) 13 (16) 40 (16)
73 ( 4) 67 ( 5) 5i ( 6) 78 ( 3)
39 (13) 42 (12) 42 ( 8) 64 (lo)
42 (11) 41 (13) 46 ( 7) 70 ( 4)
53 ( 7) 53 ( 8) 58 ( 4) 70 ( 5)
81 ( 3) 74 ( 4) 54 ( 5) 64 ( 9)


















1900 1913 1950 1973 1986
1 AUSTRALIA 39.5 41.6 42.3 43.2 43.9
2 AUSTRIA 44.8 46.1 46.4 41.7 42.6
3 sELGIUM 42.3 44.0 38.7 39.3 37.9
4 CANADA 37.5 38.4 36.6 40.1 45.8
5 DENMARK 42.2 42.8 46.3 48.3 52.0
6 FINLAND 43.8 43.7 48.9 47.0 50.0
7 FRANCE 49.7 50.4 45.6 40.6 38.4
8 GERMANY 40.5 42.4 42.3 43.3 42.1
9 ITALY 44.8 45.2 39.6 41.7 43.5
10 JAPAN 55.0 49.8 42.7 48.4 48.2
11 NETHERLANDS 37.2 37.8 35.8 35.6 36.6
12 NORWAY 39.3 40.2 43.7 41.8 50.0
13 SwEDEN 45.1 46.1 48.6 47.7 51.0
14 SWITZERLAND 48.7 49.3 47.7 50.9 49.0
15 ux 42.9 43.6 44.5 44.6 43.2
16 USA 36.6 39.8 40.5 41.9 46.1
Source: A. Maddison, The World Economv in the 20th Centurv, Paris, 1989.
Here the participation rate is defined as the ratio between employment (-
labour force minus unemployment) and population.-22-
Table 2 Summary of the data of Summers en Heston (9 countries)
Group Rank G n GL GL-n ak csh P(60) CU60 CU88
I 1-19 2.6 0.87 1.33 0.46 26.2 21.5 41.7 56.9 71.6
II 20-38 2.3 1.96 2.19 0.23 20.5 17.1 34.4 30.2 36.3
III 39-57 2.6 2.54 2.50 -0.04 16.5 14.i 35.9 15.2 18.8
Iv 58-76 0.9 2.84 2.36 -0.48 12.6 5.5 46.2 9.5 8.0
v 77-95 0.8 2.56 2.06 -0.50 10.7 3.1 50.4 4.9 3.6
All countries 1.8 2.15 2.09 -0.06 17.3 12.3 41.7 23.4 27.7
Average values of the growth rate of labour productivity (G), the growth
rate of population (n), the growth rate of the labour force (GL), the in-
vestment rate in physical capital (6k), the investment rate in human capital
(ah), the participation rate 1960 (P60) and the productivity level as a
percentage of US-productivity in 196o and 1988 (CU60 en CU88).
Table 3 Numerical example of converRence to the steadv state
Country 1(P-1, so that L-1)
t y k dk~dt Y K C
Country 2(P-0.5, so that L-0.5)
y k dk~dt Y K C
0 1.41 2.00 1.41 2.00 0.99
1 1.49 2.22 11.2 1.49 2.22 1.04
2 1.57 2.45 10.1 1.57 2.45 1.10
14 2.22 4.92 3.8 2.22 4.92 1.55
100 2.99 8.94 0.0 2.99 8.94 2.09
m 3 9 0 3 9 2.i
2.00 4.00 1.00 2.00 0.70
2.05 4.20 5.0 1.03 2.10 0.72
2.i0 4.39 4.6 1.05 2.20 0.73
2.51 6.30 2.1 1.25 3.15 0.88
2.99 8.96 0.0 1.50 4.48 1.05
3 9 0 1.50 4.50 1.05
For both countries: A-POP-1, a-0.5. 0-0.3, n-p-0 and b-0.1.-23-
Footnotes
1. A combined cross-section-time-series analysis with the data of Maddison
(1989) leads to:
.~n(Y~L) --1.61.inP t 1.21.~n(Y~L)(USA) 4 3.63 R2-0.85
(-3.84) (21.47) (2.24)
The numbers between brackets are t-values. The number of observations is 80,
namely 16 countries for the years 1900, 1913, 1950, 1973 and 1986. The
dependent variable is GDP per working hour, which is explained by the par-
ticipation rate (P) and the US-productivity level. The latter term expresses
the catching-up phenomenon (Abramovitz (1989), Dowrick and Nguyen (1989) and
scott (1989).
2. The ranking in 1985 is:
1 USA 2 CANADA 3 SWITZERLAND 4 NORWAY 5 NETHERLANDS 6 AUSTRALIA 7
ITALY 8 FRANCE 9 BELGIUM 10 ISRAEL 11 SWEDEN 12 GERMANY 13 NEW ZEALAND
14 AUSTRIA 15 FINLAND 16 UK 17 DENMARK 18 JAPAN 19 SINGAPORE 20
TRIN~.TOB 21 HONG KONG 22 SPAZN 23 VENEZUELA 24 MEXICO 25 IRELAND 26
GREECE 27 ALGERIA 28 SOUTH AFRICA 29 MALAYSIA 30 URUGUAY 31 ARGENTINA
32 BRAZIL 33 CHILE 34 PANAMA 35 COLOMBIA 36 TUNISIA 37 PORTUGAL 38
COSTA RICA 39 MAURITIUS 40 KOREA, SOUTH 41 ECUADOR 42 PERU 43 GUATEMALA
44 TURKEY 45 DOM. REP 46 BOTSWANA 47 EGYPT 48 PARAGUAY 49 CONGO 50
MOROCCO 51 NICARAGUA 52 SRI LANKA 53 JAMAICA 54 BOLIVIA 55 PHILIPPINES
56 THAILAND 57 PAKISTAN 58 EL SALVADOR 59 CAMEROON 60 INDONESIA 61
HONDURAS 62 IVORY COAST 63 ZIMBABWE 64 PA N. GUINEA 65 SUDAN 66 NIGERIA
67 MAURITANZA 68 SIERRA LEONE 69 SENEGAL 70 LIBERIA 71 BANGLADESH 72
BENIN 73 ZAMBIA 74 SOMALIA 75 GHANA 76 KENYA 77 ANGOLA 78 INDIA 79
NEPAL 80 TOGO 81 MADAGASCAR 82 MOZAMBIQUE 83 BURMA 84 CHAD 85 RWANDA
86 CEN AFRICA 87 MALAWAI 88 MALI 89 NIGER 90 BURKINA FASO 91 BURUNDI
92 TANZANIA 93 ZAIRE 94 UGANDA 95 ETHIOPIA
3. See for instance Burmeister (1980).-24-
4. Here the participation rate is the ratio between the labour force (L) and
total population ( POP) and not the ratio between working-age population and
total population as is implicit in Mankiw, et.sl. (1990).
5. The following regression with the data of Summers en Heston shows this
(N-95):
~Cn(Y~L) (88) - .Zn(Y~L) (60) - 0.05 .~n(Y~L) (60) t 0.06 R2-0.003
(1.15) (0.16)
6. See for instance Scott (1989).
7. This equation can be decomposed as follows:
,~n(YIL)(88) - - 5.16 ~tng f 18.85 Á2-0.41
~n(Y~L)(88) -- 5.27 ~ng - 2.12 ,~nP(60) t 26.89 R2-0.60
~n(YIL)(88) - - 3-98 .~ng - 1.76 .~nP(60) t 0.68 .Znak ~ 21.2o R2-o.70
8. Estimation of this equation in the form of (3.11) gives:
n.ln(Y~L) - 0.40 (~ndk - ~ng) - 0.38 .~nP(60) - 0.16 ~n(Y~L)(60)t 2.89 R2-o.22
(5.16) (-2.02) (-2.73) (2.99)
The values of the coefficients are not altered. The only difference with
(3.~5) is the much ]ower t-vnlue of th~ productivity level in 1960 and
consequently the reduction of explained variance.
9. Mankiw, et.al. (1990) introduce the following approximation:
C (MRW) - SER
POP(15-19)
h POP(15-65)
We prefer the approximation of the investment rate in human capital as given
in the text. Evidently both approximations are strongly correlated:
~noh - 1.07 ~ndh(MRW) t 0.68 R2-0.92
(32.85) (12.78)-25-
10. In the form of (3.11):
e.CnL - 0.2~ (~nak-~ng) . 0.28 (~nvh-~ng) - 0.33 ~n~(60) } 2.93
(3.86) (5.05) (-5.12) (5.76)
R2 - 0.37, N- 95 en SSE - 10.62
11. This result is better than that of Mankiw, et.al. (1990), who find
a-0.48, which is clearly too high.
12. The equation is (N-~O):
~nL - 0.27 (~n6k-~ng) t 0.35 ( ~nvh-~ng) - 0.46 ~nL(60) t 4.09
(3.58) (4.32) (-6.54) (7.21)
R2 - 0.44 en N- ~0
This gives a-0.25, ~-0.32 and a-0.0219.-26-
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Appendix The data
Countries in the dataset of Summers~Heston ( 1991) and Barro (1991). The
ssmple is 1960-1988, unless otherwise stated.
S~H BAR SAMP
1 USA 66 98 88
2 CANADA 50 86 88
3 SWITZERLAND 127 82 88
4 NORWAY 122 78 88
5 NETHERLANDS 121 77 88
6 AUSTRALIA 131 ill 88
7 ITALY 118 74 88
8 FRANCE 112 69 88
9 BELGIUM 108 65 88
10 ISRAEL 89 49 88
11 SwEDEN 126 81 88
12 GERMANY 113 70 88
13 NEW ZEALAND 133 113 g8
14 AUSTRIA 107 64 88
15 FINLAND 111 68 88
16 uK 129 84 88
17 DENMaRK 110 67 88
18 JAPAN 90 50 88
19 SINGAPORE 188 59 85
20 TRINB~TOB 65 97 88
21 HONG KONG 84 45 88
22 SPAIN 125 80 88
23 VENEZUELA 78 110 8~
24 MEXICO 60 94 88
25 IRELAND 117 73 gg
26 GREECE 114 71 88
27 ALGERIA 1 1 88
28 SOUTH AFRICA 38 33 88-29-
29 MALAYSIA 94 54 88
30 URUGUAY 77 109 88
31 ARGENTINA 67 99 88
32 BRAZIL 69 101 87
33 CHILE 70 l02 88
34 PANAMA 62 96 86
35 COLOMBIA 71 103 88
36 TUNISIA 43 38 88
37 PORTUGAL 124 79 88
38 COSTA RICA 51 87 88
39 MAURITIUS 28 24 88
40 KOREA, SOUTH 92 52 88
41 ECUADOR 72 104 88
42 PERU 75 107 88
43 GUATEMALA 56 90 88
44 TURKEY 128 g3 gg
45 DOM. REP 53 88 88
46 BOTSWANA 4 4 86
47 EGYPT 13 10 88
48 PARAGUAY 74 106 88
49 CONGO 12 9 86
5o MOROCCO 29 25 88
51 NICARAGUA 61 95 86
52 SRI LANKA 101 60 87
53 JAMAICA 59 93 87
54 BOLIVIA 68 188 88
55 PHILIPPINES 98 57 88
56 THAILAND 104 63 88
57 PAKISTAN 97 56 gg
58 EL SALVADOR 54 89 88
59 CAMEROON 7 6 gg
60 INDONESIA 86 118 62~88
61 HONDURAS 58 92 88
62 IVORY COAST 20 16 88
63 ZIMBABWE 47 42 88































































G n GL GL-n
1 USA 1.52 1.10 1,77 ,67
2 CANADA 1.59 1.35 2.43 1.08
3 SWITZERLAND 1.82 .71 .87 .15
4 NORWAY 2.80 .57 1.42 .85
5 NETHERLANDS 2.08 .89 1.41 .51
6 AUSTRALIA 1.70 1.70 2.22 .51
7 ITALY 3.68 .48 .38 -.09
8 FRANCE 2.84 .72 .86 .13
9 BELGIUM 2.56 .28 .57 .29
10 ISRAEL 2.85 2.68 2.97 ,28
11 SWEDEN 1.93 .39 .96 .57
12 GERMANY 2.59 .34 .40 .06
13 NEW ZEALAND .38 1.21 1.95 .73
14 AUSTRIA 3.42 .25 .16 -.08
15 FINLAND 3.08 .39 .79 .40
16 UK 2.11 .29 .45 .16
17 DENMARK 1.91 .40 1.07 .67
18 JAPAN 5.34 .94 1.12 .18
19 SINGAPORE 4.44 1.77 3.33 1.56
20 TRIN8~TOB .39 1.69 1.92 .23
21 HONG KONG 5.25 2-24 3.37 1.13
22 SPAIN 3.83 .88 .72 -.16
23 VENEZUELA 1.15 3.45 3.73 .28
24 MExICO 1.38 2.83 3.45 .62
25 IRELAND 2.33 .83 .89 .05
26 GREECE 4.36 .66 .43 -.23
27 ALGERIA 2.30 2.86 2.30 -.55
28 SOUTH AFRICA 1.47 2.28 2.22 -.05
29 MALAYSIA 3.04 2.62 3.11 .49
30 URUGUAY .63 .60 .54 -.06
31 ARGENTINA .96 1.52 1.18 -.34
32 BRAZIL 3.86 2.50 2.99 .49
33 cxILE .66 1.82 2.15 .33
34 PANAMA 3.10 2.59 2-79 .20-32-
35 Co[.oMBIA 2.01 2.32 2.64 .31
36 TuNISIA 2.26 2.21 2.62 .40
37 PORTUGAL 3.63 .45 1.13 .68
3S COSTA RICA 1.35 2.73 3.43 .69
39 MAURITIUS 1.75 1.66 2.75 1.08
40 KoREA, SOUTH 5.51 1.95 2.75 .79
41 ECUADOR 2.38 2.89 2.76 -.13
42 PERU .96 2.65 2.72 .07
43 cUATEt~tALA 1.45 2.91 2.48 -.42
44 TURKEY 3.45 2.42 1.75 -.66
45 DOM. REP 1.89 2.61 2.85 .23
46 BOTSWANA 7.08 3.24 2.43 -.81
47 EGYPT 4.38 2.49 2.21 -.27
48 PARACUAY 2.36 2.88 2.98 .10
49 CONGO 3.63 2.81 1.94 -.87
5o MoROCCO 2.86 2.52 2.85 .32
51 NICARAGUA -.09 2.98 3.09 .il
52 SRI LANxA 1.14 1.88 2.02 .14
53 JAMAICA .36 1.46 2.05 .59
54 BOLIVIA .99 2.53 2.16 -.37
55 PHILIPPINES 2.02 2.75 2.52 -.22
56 THAILAND 3.82 2.61 2.69 .07
57 PAKISTAN 2.78 3.oi 2.56 -.45
58 EL SALVADOR .23 2.43 3.17 ,74
59 CAMEROON 3.82 2.69 1.71 -.97
60 INDONESIA 3.32 2.19 2.16 -.03
61 HONDURAS 1.64 3.32 3.12 -.20
62 IVORY COAST 2.16 4.04 2.72 -1.32
63 ZIMBABWE 1.43 3.42 3.06 -.35
64 PA N. GUINEA 1.93 2.44 1.94 -.49
65 SUDAN -.02 2.73 2.39 -.34
66 NIGERIA -.50 2.74 1.64 -1.09
67 MAURITANIA .43 2.42 2.09 -.33
68 SIERRA LEONE 1.15 1.89 .94 -.95
69 SENEGAL -.10 2.58 2.66 .07
70 LIBERIA .08 2.97 2.46 -.51-33-
71 BANGLADESH 1.15 2.65 i.95 -.70
72 BENIN .50 2.81 1.84 -.96
73 ~IA -1.42 3.15 2.81 -.33
74 SOMALIA .13 3.03 2.46 -.57
75 GHANA -.19 2.60 2.15 -.45
76 KENYA 1.6G 3.82 3.47 -.35
77 ANGOLA -1.32 2.35 1.90 -.45
78 INDIA 1.40 2.26 1.72 -.53
79 NEPAL 1.60 2.32 1.60 -.7z
80 ToGO 2.32 2.89 2.31 -.57
81 MADAGASCAR -.95 2.70 1.88 -.81
82 MOZAMBIQUE -1.52 2.47 2.59 .12
83 Bt1RMA 2.73 2.14 2. 07 -. 07
84 CHAD -1.26 1.99 1.60 -.39
85 RWANDA 1.13 3.20 2.79 -.40
86 CEN AFRICA .24 1.99 1.16 -.82
87 MALAWAI 1.62 3.03 2.29 -.73
88 [~fAL1 -. 06 2. 34 1. 92 -. 41
89 NIGER .64 2.79 2.12 -.66
90 BURKINA FASO 2.28 2.27 1.75 -.52
91 BURUNDI 1.05 2.03 1.52 -.50
92 TANZANIA 2.60 3.27 2.77 -.49
93 ZAIRE .65 2.69 1.78 -.90
94 UGANDA .7i 3.27 3.14 -.13



































ak ~h P(60) P(88) SER
17.16 24.44 40.49 48.76 99
22.89 27.63 37.26 5o.i8 io3
30.22 13.48 46.71 48.83 63
32.78 24.70 39.26 49.75 97
23.97 28.74 35.48 40.88 102
28.21 23.41 40.57 46.75 95
27.91 18.16 41.28 40.20 75
25.87 22.21 43.21 44.91 96
22.96 24.91 38.52 41.82 96
26.32 21.19 35.85 38.79 76
22.65 18.98 43.72 51.28 83
26.89 15.67 47.22 48.07 74
21.96 22.80 37.26 45.64 85
27.52 16.45 48.01 46.84 79
34.22 22.32 45.68 51.09 102
18.12 19.23 46.27 48.46 89
27.81 22.56 45.64 55.01 103
30.95 20.20 47.51 50.00 96
29.24 21.65 32.78 47.92 71
18.67 20.98 36.21 38.59 76
20.89 17.72 38.93 53.10 69
26.21 23.96 37.97 36.30 91
16.47 14.14 31.82 34.19 45
19.63 19.oi 28.92 34.26 55
26.44 24.31 39.47 4o.i2 96
25.41 21.16 40.63 38.11 86
26.00 19.29 26.43 22.69 51
25.48 7.10 35.19 34.66 25
28.69 15.31 34.59 39.57 53
15.74 17.26 40.54 39.84 70
11.77 17.79 39.33 35.79 70
19.86 10.88 32.15 36.57 35
13.32 21.17 32.57 35.70 69
24.82 17.73 33.27 35.08 59-35-
35 CoLOMBIA 17.i9 16.52 30.25 32.97 50
36 TUrrISIA 14.89 13.93 27.97 3i.28 39
37 PORTUGAL 23.65 i2.36 38.00 45.93 47
38 COSTA RICA i4.i9 13.60 3o.i4 36.44 4i
39 MAURITIUS i2.32 17.17 29.69 39.98 5i
40 xoREA, SouTR 24.74 28.io 33.So 42.00 95
41 ECUADOR 24.84 17.37 3i.64 30-52 55
42 pERU i5.87 20.32 31.98 32.62 65
43 GUATEMALA 8.38 5.3i 3i.97 28.47 i7
44 TURxEY 20.99 8.27 50.75 42.29 42
45 DOM. REP 14.75 17.83 28.03 29.88 50
46 sozswANA 23-85 6.64 43.65 35.63 29
47 EGYPT 6.21 21.33 29.05 26.92 62
48 PARAGUAY 11.35 9.68 32.00 32.95 3i
49 CONGO 14.30 18.86 46.10 37.02 87
5o MoROCCO 8.71 11.03 28.08 30.69 31
51 NICARAGUA 18.69 13.17 29.59 30.46 39
52 SRI LANKA 21.20 17.54 35.89 37.24 63
53 JAMAICA 21.58 14.i4 40.99 48.02 58
54 BOLIVIA i6.77 10.71 34.53 31.21 37
55 PHILIPPINES 19.08 17.03 38.15 35.84 65
56 TxAILAND 14.90 5.89 50.92 52.04 30
57 PAKISTAN i5.47 6.99 34.32 30-35 24
58 EL SALVADOR 7.70 7.35 32.62 39.93 24
59 cAMEROON 10.26 4.70 48.83 37.42 23
60 INDONESIA i9.77 9-96 39.14 38.9i 39
61 xoNDURAS 13.13 11.28 31.90 3o.i8 36
62 IVORY COAST 9-81 3.70 53.99 37.73 20
63 ZIMBABWE 17.55 10.64 44.14 40.05 47
64 PA N. GUINEA 23.92 2.78 53.95 47.05 15
65 SUDAN 1.78 5.40 35.18 32.06 19
66 NIGERIA 11.72 2.61 110.85 82.07 29
67 MAURITANIA 13.26 3.25 36.82 33.6i i2
68 SIERRA LEONF. 2.24 3.66 46.36 36.05 i7
69 sENEOAL 7.21 3.09 42.05 42.92 13
70 LIBERIA 28.82 5.50 41.80 36.75 23-36-
71 BANGLADESH 5-87 5-30 33.91 28.67 18
72 BENZN 5.52 3.26 61.31 47.i2 20
73 ~IA 28.39 5.24 36.i9 33.06 i9
74 SOMALIA lo.ol 4.10 41.39 35.43 17
75 ~NA 7-59 8.98 43.41 38.34 39
76 xErtxA 14.44 4.48 44.55 40.51 20
77 AN~LA 11.83 2.69 48.15 43.20 13
78 INDIA 16.51 7.90 44.26 38.17 35
79 N~AL 9.86 5.09 49.06 41.15 25
80 TOGO 16.72 4.52 46.36 39.61 21
81 MADAGASCAR 8.65 7.04 51.12 42.63 36
82 MOZAMBIQUE 12.43 1.33 52.46 54.24 7
83 BtTRMA 11.58 5.22 45.89 45.19 24
84 cHAD 15.i0 i.52 39.26 35.65 6
85 RwANDA 4.54 .35 55-86 49.99 2
86 CEN AFRICA 8.33 2.15 60.37 48.03 13
87 MALAWAI ii.75 .80 49.74 40.69 4
88 ntALI 6.40 1.52 39.44 35.16 6
89 NIGER 8.75 i.01 59.09 49.25 6
90 BURKINA FASO 16.67 .95 52.55 46.80 5
91 BURUNDI 7.87 .83 60.23 52-35 5
92 TANZANIA 18.79 .54 55-05 48.07 3
93 ZAIRE 9.53 11.98 47.54 37.15 57
94 UGANDA 3.96 1.61 49.52 48.04 8
95 ~IOPIA 4.72 2.34 51.17 44.98 12-37-
YL(60) YL(88) SER AV
1 uSA 24650 37608 99 39.5
2 CANADA 20816 32421 103 37.5
3 SWITZERLAND 19935 33080 63 38.4
4 NORWAY 13863 30103 97 40.4
5 NETHERLANDS 15745 28050 102 36.6
6 AUSTRALIA 17753 28490 95 37.0
7 ITALY 10598 29201 75 36.7
8 FRANCE 12367 27140 96 39.5
9 BELGIUM 13516 27481 96 38.9
10 ISRAEL 11024 24249 76 37.5
11 SWEDEN 14821 25330 83 39.7
12 GERMANY 12786 26219 74 37.6
13 NEW ZEALAND 19378 21609 85 36.8
14 AUSTRIA 9322 23907 79 37.8
15 FINLAND 10326 24190 102 38.5
16 UK 13766 24725 89 38.9
17 DENMARK 12920 21969 103 38.2
18 JAPAN 5684 24417 96 36.6
19 SINGAPGRE 7334 21735 71 34.0
2o TRINB~TOB 13128 14671 76 35.5
21 HONG KONG 5966 25006 69 35.9
22 SPAIN 7113 20398 91 38.1
23 VENEZUELA 12252 16719 45 33.8
24 MExICO 9923 14581 55 34.4
25 IRELAND 8141 15546 96 39.4
26 GREECE 464~ 15366 86 36.5
27 ALGERIA 6340 12oi1 51 34.3
28 SOUTH AFRICA 8477 12781 25 34.3
29 MALAYSIA 5i52 i1945 53 34.8
30 URUGUAY 10855 12948 70 36.5
31 ARGENTINA 8595 11258 70 36.0
32 BRAZIL 4367 12142 35 32.8
33 cxILE 9524 11480 69 34.9
34 PANAMA 4595 1oi68 59 34.2-38-
35 CoLOMBIA 6192 10818 50 33.2
36 TUNISIA 4982 9336 39 35.5
37 PoRTUGAL 4257 11583 47 36.2
38 COSTA RICA 7147 10421 41 32.8
39 MAURITIUS 7115 tt570 5t 34.4
40 KOREA, SouTH 2730 12275 95 34.3
41 EcUADOR 4614 8933 55 32.9
42 PgtU 6659 8725 65 34.6
43 cuAT~tALA 5213 7822 17 32.5
44 TURKEY 3288 8507 42 34.4
45 DoM. REP 4373 7388 50 34.0
46 BoTSwAxA 1081 6402 29 33.5
47 EGStPT 1917 6373 62 33.5
48 PARACUAY 3744 7210 31 33.6
49 CoxGO 2368 5989 87 35.3
5o MOROCCO 3040 6711 31 32.9
51 NICARAGUA 5921 5773 39 32.0
52 SRI LANKA 3869 5259 63 35.2
53 JAMAICA 4461 4918 58 36.5
54 BOLIVIA 3306 4362 37 32.4
55 PHILIPPINES 3100 5431 65 32.7
56 THAILAND 1934 5532 30 32.3
57 PAKISTAN 2389 5162 24 34.8
58 EL SALVADOR 4000 4269 24 32.9
59 CAMEROOx 1507 4314 23 33.6
60 INDONFSIA 1880 4404 39 33.7
61 HONDURAS 2820 4458 36 31.7
62 IVORY COAST 1890 3445 20 31.9
63 zIa~ABwE 2122 3158 47 32.6
64 PA x. GUINEA 2104 3603 15 32.6
65 SUDAx 2771 2754 19 31.7
66 NIGERIA 3212 2786 29 33.7
67 MAURITANIA 2519 2846 12 32.3
68 SIE:RRA LFANE 1878 2561 17 33.3
69 Ss1vEGAL 2700 2623 13 32.3
70 LIBERIA 2308 2357 23 33.9-39-
71 BANGLADESH 183i 2441 18 32.8
72 BENIN i752 2020 20 32.1
73 ZAMBIA 3235 2i62 19 32.3
74 SOMALIA 2i5i 2232 i7 32.3
75 GHANA 2416 2287 39 32.6
76 xENYA 1425 2226 20 31.8
77 ANGOLA 27i6 1944 13 33.5
78 INDIA 1394 2059 35 33.i
79 NEPAL ii90 1771 25 3i.5
8o Toco 886 1685 21 3i.5
81 MADAGASCAR 1981 i426 36 3i.8
82 MOZAMBIQUE 2607 ~694 7 33,2
83 aUxMA 743 1458 24 33.4
84 Ct-tAD i999 i455 6 33.7
85 swANDA 963 i322 2 30.5
86 cEN AFxICA i335 i428 13 32.3
87 MALAWAI 850 1334 4 32.8
88 MALI 1371 1348 6 31.4
89 xIGER 1022 i222 6 30.9
9o BURKINA FASO 719.0o i2o9 5 3i.9
91 BURUNDI 785.00 1054 5 32.0
92 TANZANIA 494.00 1015 3 32.1
93 ZAIRE 797 958 57 33.0
94 UGANDA 749 895 8 32.5
95 ~IOPIA 5i2 738 i2 32.0-40-
CU60 CU88 y~ k~ h
i usA ioo.oo 100.00 11.24 31.61 45.03
2 CANADA 84.44 86.20 15.66 56.43 68.13
3 SWITZERLAND 80.87 87.96 12.47 65.99 29.44
4 NORWAY 56.23 80.04 26.05 153.i7 i15.44
5 NETHERLANDS 63.87 74.58 19.79 80.44 96.46
6 AUSTRALIA 72.02 75.75 14.67 6i.73 5i.23
7 ITALY 42.99 77.64 16.85 85.80 55.85
8 FRANCE 50.17 72.16 17.55 79.38 68.i7
9 BELaIUM 54.83 73.07 20.50 89.14 96.75
10 ISRAEL 44.72 64.47 9.43 32.30 26.01
11 SWEDEN 6o.i2 67.35 14.76 61.95 5i.9i
1z GERMANY 51.87 69.7i 14.74 74.i9 43.23
13 NEW ZEALAND 78.61 57.45 12.96 45.78 47.54
14 AUSTRIA 37.81 63.56 16.41 86.00 51.42
15 FINLAND 41.89 64.32 26.26 166.68 108.74
16 UK 55.84 65.74 12.44 42.62 45.24
17 DENMARK 52.41 58.41 21.46 110.39 89.57
18 JAPAN 23.05 64.92 17.69 92.13 60.14
19 SINCiAPORE 29.75 57.79 i3.81 59.66 44.19
20 TRINB~TOB 53.25 39.oi 8.75 24.42 27.45
21 HONG KONG 24.20 66.49 7.06 20.37 17.28
22 SPAIN 28.85 54.23 18.12 80.69 73.78
23 VEKEZUELA 49.70 44.45 3.26 6.35 5.45
24 MEXICO 40.25 38.77 6.08 15.24 14.76
25 IRELAND 33.02 41.33 18.88 85.59 78.72
26 GREECE 18.85 40.85 16.74 75.08 62.53
27 ALGERIA 25.72 3i.93 S.ii 26.82 19.90
28 SOUTH AFRICA 34.38 33.98 3.4i ii.93 3.32
29 MALAYSIA 20.90 31.76 7.56 28.47 15.20
30 URUGUAY 44.03 34.42 8.65 24.30 26.66
31 ARGENTINA 34.86 29.93 4.9i 8.87 13.41
32 BRAZIL 17.71 32.28 3.84 10.17 5.57
33 cxILE 38.63 30.52 6.06 11.83 18.81
34 PANAMA 18.64 27.03 7.63 24.98 17.84-41-
35 COLOMBIA 25.11 28.76 5.28 12.40 11.92
36 TUNISIA 20.21 24.82 3.98 8.22 7-70
37 PORT[1GAL 17.26 30.79 9.81 42.55 22.25
38 COSTA RICA 28.99 27.70 3.22 5-91 5.67
39 MAURITIUS 28.86 30.76 4.76 8.80 12.27
40 KOREA, soUTx 11.07 32.63 14.36 51.08 58.02
41 ECUADOR 18.71 23.75 6.92 21.76 15-23
42 PERU 27.01 23.19 5.50 11.42 14.62
43 GUATEMALA 21.14 20.79 .71 .75 .47
44 TuRxEY 13.33 22.62 3.15 8.91 3.51
45 DOM. REP 17.74 19.64 4.53 8.77 10.60
46 BoTSwAxA 4.38 17.02 2.33 6.75 1.88
47 EcYPT 7.77 16.94 2.36 1.95 6.72
48 PARAGUAY 15.18 19.17 1.77 2.54 2.17
49 coNGO 9.60 15-92 4.42 8.10 10.68
5o MoROCCO 12.33 17.84 1.69 1.96 2.48
51 NICARAGUA 24.02 15-35 3.86 9.05 6.38
52 SRI LANKA 15.69 13.98 7.86 24.21 20.04
53 JAMAICA 18.09 13.07 7.31 24.43 16.02
54 BOLIVIA 13.41 11.59 3.16 7.03 4.49
55 PHILIPPINES 12.57 14.44 5.40 13.31 11.88
56 THAILAND 7.84 14.70 1.51 2.95 1.16
57 PAKISTAN 9.69 13.72 1.68 3.24 1.46
58 EL SALVADOR 16.2z 11.35 1.02 1.06 1.01
59 CAMEROON 6.11 11.47 .81 1.09 .50
60 INDONESIA 7.62 11.71 3.80 10.47 5.27
61 HONDURAS 11.44 11.85 2.13 3-36 2.89
62 IVORY COAST 7.66 9.16 .44 .48 .18
63 zIMSABwE 8.60 8.39 2.63 5.48 3.32
64 PA N. GUINEA 8.53 9-58 1.20 3-85 .44
65 SUDAN 11.24 7.32 .16 .03 .11
66 NIGERIA 13.03 7.40 .51 .77 ,17
67 MAURITANIA 10.21 7.56 .78 1.40 .34
68 SIERRA LEONE 7.61 6.80 .17 .05 .09
69 SENEGAL 10.95 6.97 .38 .36 .15


























7.42 6.49 .53 .40 .36
7.io 5.37 .29 .20 .i2
13.i2 5.74 2.24 7.Si 1.44
8.72 5.93 .63 .79 .32
9.80 6.08 1.17 1.17 1.39
5.78 5.91 .83 1.36 .42
11.01 5.16 .59 .95 .2i
5.65 5.47 2.47 5.62 2.69
4.82 4.70 .93 1.26 .65
3.59 4.48 1.21 2.57 .69
8.03 3.79 1.02 1.i5 .93
10.57 4.50 .29 .49 .05
3.oi 3.87 1.18 1.92 .87
8.10 3.86 .47 1.02 .10
3.90 3.51 .02 .ol .00105
5.41 3.79 .36 .43 .i1
3.44 3.54 .14 .21 .oi
5.56 3.58 .18 .15 .03
4.14 3.24 .14 .16 .O1
2.91 3.21 .30 .68 .03
3.18 2.80 .13 .14 .ol
2.00 2.69 .14 .33 .00983
3.23 2.54 1.93 2.39 3.01
3.03 2.37 .09 .04 .oi
2.07 1.96 .19 .12 .061
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